Abstract
Some names in our language are not indeed applied to anything or nobody if they are taken literally, because they lack their referent. According to Searle, nameś significance does not depend on how they can give account or not of world samples; their significance "is measured" in the use of them in this or that speech, amid explanations or characterizations forged by rules, because to speak a language it is to take active part in a complex rule-governed behavior. This article supports how in the philosophy of Searle meaningfulness of speeches, including those of science or fiction, is achieved in the issuance of illocutionary acts that make possible the invention of worlds full of meanings, even when they lack direct referent.
| Translated title of the contribution | Searle: Meaning and reference in the speeches of science |
|---|---|
| Original language | Spanish |
| Pages (from-to) | 73-95 |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| Journal | Veritas |
| Issue number | 36 |
| State | Published - Apr 2017 |